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GEN. JAMES WILKINSON AND OF HIS CONNEXION WITH AARON BURR. [“Proofs” Pages 41-60] Daniel Clark  1766-1813 |
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GEN. JAMES WILKINSON AND OF HIS CONNEXION WITH AARON BURR. [“Proofs” Pages 41-60] Daniel Clark 1766-1813 |
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Each section below reflects a true page of this historical publication. Note links refer to the letters and documents that Daniel Clark used as evidence of his former friend's treachery. People and place-name links are to biographical and geographical pages in Encyclopedia Louisiana. Time links are to the Encyclopedia Louisiana Timeline. |
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the police and the military establishments of Louisiana will be found immediately indispensable to the Mexican provinces. I beg you to write me fully on the question in cypher by Power, whose presence in Philadelphia is necessary, as well to clear his own character, attacked by Wayne, as to support the fact of the outrage recently offered to the Spanish crown in his person and bring me either the person or the deposition, now under your command, who has been suborned by Wayne, to bear false witness against me, and afterwards for fear he should recant, bribed him to leave Kentucky. Power will give you the perfect account of his infamous transaction, and I conjure you, by all the ties of friendship and policy, to assist him on this occasion. IF SPAIN DOES NOT RESENT THE OUTRAGE OFFERED TO POWER IN THE FACE OF ALL KENTUCKY. My letter to the Baron will explain the motives which carry me to Philadelphia, from whence I will again write to you. Power will explain to you circumstances which justifies the belief of the great treachery that has been practiced with respect to the money lately sent me. For the love of God and friendship, enjoin great secrecy and caution in all our concerns. Never suffer my name to be written or spoken. THE SUSPICION OF WASHINGTON IS WIDE AWAKE. Beware of Bradford the Fort-Pitt refugee; HE SEEKS TO MAKE PEACE—there are spies every where. We have a report here that you are appointed governor of Louisiana.—God grant it, as I presume the Baron will be promoted. I am your affectionate friend. W ———— |
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Copy of a letter in cypher received from Wilkinson.—Natchez, Feb. 6th,
1797. (Signed) MANUEL GAYOSO DE LEMOS In a separate paper he says what follows: This letter will be delivered to you by Nolan whom you know is a child of my own raising, true to his profession, and firm in his ATTACHMENT TO SPAIN. I consider him a powerful instrument in our hands. Should occasion offer, I will answer for his conduct. I am deeply interested in whatsoever concerns him, and I confidently recommend him to your warmest confidence. I am evidently your's affectionately, WILKINSON. A copy, (Signed) MANUEL GAYOSO DE LEMOS This letter was written in cypher, which may account of the unguarded language in which it is couched. The perils and abuses of which he complains, were the suspicions of his countrymen and the vigilance of his commander, The crisis of which he speaks, was the prospect of a rupture between the king who corrupted him and the nation he betrayed. With what creeping meanness does the fawning sycophant complain to a foreign officer of the injury he has received from his commander; with what detestable malignity does he excite a foreign nation to resent an insult offered by his own; with what abject fear does the trembling coward express his fears |
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of discovery; and how coolly does the sanguinary traitor set the Spaniards on their guard against the attempts of one who sought to keep his country in peace.—Unexampled depravity!—Unheard of meanness!—Wickedness unparalleled in the annals of treachery! Can this monstrous charge be true? Is it possible that a man, enjoying high command, and receiving daily marks of confidence of his nation, should not only be tempted to betray it, but for days, and months, and years should continue in her service—wear the honourable livery of her household—eat her bread, and yet be continually plotting her destruction, exciting her enemies to the attack, pointing out the defenseless places, and meanly receiving the wages of such depravity. How did he dare to issue a command to men of whom the meanest had twenty thousand times his worth? How did he dare to punish crimes when the blackest criminal might come and whiten by his side?—Did he dare to punish drunkenness whose life was a continued scene of debauchery? Did not his hand tremble when he signed the sentence for desertion?—or what crime in the catalogue of military offenses could he punish without thinking of his own? Yes! he could do this without remorse; his mind is framed for treachery, and possesses a peculiar apathy that enables him to speak of his crimes as if they were virtues, and which takes away all hope of amendment and all sense of shame. Yes! this proof of unparalleled treachery is too well authenticated to be called in doubt; it is proved better than by many witnesses who should swear |
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that they heard him use the expressions contained in the letter; they might be actuator by hatred or corruption, but this evidence comes in =a shape that cannot be questioned; it not only carries with it the proof of its veracity, but it is invested with the forms of law, and would be received in many tribunals of the country where it was written. It is a copy certified by governor Gayoso from his records; every record authenticated in this way has under the Spanish government, the force of an exemplification in England or the United States, and an officer who should certify a fabrication of this kind would incur the same penalties that are inflicted on the highest forgery with us. This copy is altogether in the hand-writing of governor Gayoso, who has added his signature; both are extremely well known, have been proved by two witnesses, and can be by a thousand in this territory. Gayoso died in the year 1799, was the bosom friend of Wilkinson, and continued so until the day of his death, which, as is generally asserted here, was accelerated by too frequent libations to their mutual affection. He had therefore no motive to commit such forgery for his ruin; had he any to betray his confidence by the delivery of this evidence of his guilt? Nine; nor did he foresee that , by the inscrutable decrees of a just and an avenging god, this paper would be the means of punishing the treachery of his friend. Mr. Power had been an active instrument in forwarding the revolution in Kentucky; he had spent much time and run great risks in the service, and he thought that his exertions merited reward. He had intended going to Madrid to solicit it, and he knew |
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that the best evidence he could carry with him would be that of the persons whom he had brought over to the allegiance of his master. He had seen this letter from Wilkinson. The high terms in which he is mentioned in it, determined him to ask this copy as his voucher. It was given hi with the less reluctance, as the general had declared he could rely on his discretion, and as the letter gave him no new information, and the delivery of it could not be considered as a breach of confidence. I feel that this simple statement must be convincing to all who read it, and of course that the evidence of treachery is complete. I therefore proceed to the other proofs with reluctance; but I have imposed the task on myself, and will proceed. We have seen in the examination of the accounts, that Mr. Philip Nolan was the agent of general Wilkinson. He acknowledges it in his publication called the Plain Tail. It is notorious, and can readily be proved, that he was not only a clerk and commercial agent, but a confidential friend in his more delicate negotiations with the Spaniards. It is so stated in a paper written by the general, and annexed to the document last cited. “This will be handed to you (says the general to Gayoso) by Nolan, who you know as a child of my raising, true to his profession, and firm in his attachment to Spain. I consider him as a POWERFUL INSTRUMENT in our hands should occasion offer—I will answer for his conduct. I am deeply interested in whatever concerns him, and I confidently recommend him to your warmest confidence. I am evidently yours—WILKINSON. |
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In the hand-writing of this powerful instrument in the general's hands —of this CHILD of so worthy a parent, who is recommended for his firm attachment to Spain, we have instructions evidently dictated by Wilkinson, and delivered by him to Power, (No. 35.) They begin by recommending an artful contrivance to deceive the public on the subject of his frequent visits. They enlarge much on the necessity of producing Newman, or at least procuring some affidavit from him contradictory of the one he had before made, and the directions on this subject evince the hand of a master in the art of subornation. They show a great solitude that Power should lull suspicion by ample testimonials of his character, and the first part closes with an injunction to bear no paper that carries his name. The second part, tho' shorter, is more valuable on account of the many corroborative circumstances it contains. It begins with a direction how to employ the 640 dollars in his hands, as well as the merchandise in which his money has bid, and which he facetiously calls la cargaison, interlarding his treasure, as he does his conversation , with scraps of French. This 640 dollars was the residue of the sum delivered by Portell for the use of Wilkinson, to Power, and which was retained by the latter for expenses. Small as this sum is, it was an object of solicitude. He requests that it may be secured to him in the settlement, and we shall find it here after figuring in the accounts which Mr. Power renders to the Baron de Carondelet, of his mission, and in the allowance which the latter makes of his expenses. “I have urged (says |
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Wilkinson in these instructions) the necessity of your presence in the metropolis,” Let us refer to the letter, and we there find that the general had indeed urged it: “I beg you (he there says) to write to me in cypher by Power, whose presence is necessary in Philadelphia, as well as to clear his own character attacked by Wayne, as to support the fact of the outrage, &c. Again, as the instructions say, “ you must do the needful to expose and detect past treachery of indiscretion, and to prevent either in future. I have referred particularly on this head,” and the letter shows the truth of the allegation, for it says, "Power will explain to you circumstances which justify the belief of the great treachery there has been practised with respect to the money lately sent to me; for the love of God and friendship, enjoin great secrecy and caution in all our concerns.” How convincing is this proof! how irresistible the conviction of its authenticity. The letter certified by the general's best friend, long since dead, his hand writing ready to be proved by the testimony of a whole province—the instructions copied by his confidential agent and tallying so precisely with the letter— both coinciding with the testimony of Mr. Power, corroborated by the co-existing circumstances, and throwing light as well on the preceding evidence as on that which will follow. The same note of instructions gives new weight to the reason I alleged why Power wished to obtain a copy of the letter, to wit, that he meditated a voyage to Spain—a project too, as it would seem, formed by the general himself, for he says, “if I cross the water, you are to accompany,” |
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After having successfully fulfilled the mission on which he had been sent, having delivered his cargo of dollars and received his returns in treasonable projects, Mr. Powers came back to Natchez, from whence he rendered the account of his mission by the letter (No. 36) dated 9th May 1797, and received an answer of which we have the original (No. 37, 28th May, same year,) which shows the exactness of all Mr. Power's details. The 640 dollars are not forgotten in this correspondence, and an account is rendered of the merchandise in which the dollars were concealed. In the Baron's answer , a new mission is spoken of, for which Power is directed to prepare. The instructions for this embassy are contained in a letter from the Baron, of which the original is ready to be produced (No. 38. May 1797.) These instructions are written with more caution than any of the preceding papers. Wilkinson had just attained the command in chief; the governor, who knew his character, was not so certain of his co-operation as when he was subordinate in command; he was the more doubtful, because Wilkinson had shown a disposition to disavow his former connection by marching a body of troops to take possession of the posts. “No person, ( the governor says to Power) shall be informed for your business, not even the intendant; Don Andres (the secretary) will be the only person in the secret.” He then states the dispositions that the army of the United States, under the command of Wilkinson, are making to get possession of the posts pursuant to the treaty; and instructs his agent in the pretences |
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which he is to urge to retard its fulfillment and stop the march of the troops. For this purpose Mr. Power is furnished with and official letter directed to the commander of the American army. (No. 39.) This he tells us is the ostensible purport of this mission. The second object which his warns him “no one ought to discover, and which for this reason he ought to retain in his memory, is to sound and examine the disposition of the people of the western country, the militia of which it is said had received orders to march” in which case he is directed to give information to the commandant of New-Madrid. He then gives him a kind of cypher. in which he is to communicate the most material facts on this point. After some artful instructions as to the language he is to hold to the people of Kentucky, the Baron comes at once to the point and says, ”if a hundred thousand dollars distributed in Kentucky would be sufficient to raise an insurrection, I am sure the minister should sacrifice them with pleasure, and you may promise them, without much risk, to those who enjoy the confidence of the people; with a like sum for the army in case of necessity. and twenty pieces of cannon.” On the subject of Wilkinson he says, “You will endeavour to discover with your natural penetration the disposition of the general. I doubt very much whether a person of his disposition can through vanity prefer the advantage of commanding the army of the Atlantic States, to that of being the founder, the deliverer —in find, the Washington of the Western country; his part is as brilliant as it is easy to perform.—All eyes are fixed upon |
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him—he possesses the confidence of his fellow-citizens and of the volunteers of Kentucky; on the slightest movement the people will name him general of the new republic; his reputation will form an army, and Spain as well as France will furnish him the means of paying it. Let him seize Fort Massack, and we will immediately send him arms and artillery, and Spain, confining itself to the possession of the forts of Natchez and the Walnut-hills until the confederation takes place, will yield to the states of the west all the eastern shore of Ohio, which will make an extensive and powerful republic, united by its interest and by its situation with Spain, who, in concert with it, will force the savages to make a part with it, and to mix in time with its citizens. The people are discontented with the new taxes - Spain and France are disgusted by the connections of the United States with England.—The army is weak and devoted to Wilkinson. “The threats of congress justify me at once, and without any disguise, to succour the western states; money will not be wanting, for I will immediately send a frigate to La Vera Cruz to fetch it as well as ammunition. One instant of firmness and resolution is all that is necessary to make the people of the west perfectly happy. If this instant is suffered to escape, and we should be forced to give up the posts, Kentucky and Tennessee, surrounded by the said posts and without any communication with Louisiana, will remain forever under the oppression of the Atlantic States. If you represent these arguments with force to Wilkinson, Sebastian, La Cassagne, |
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c. if you spread their notions among the people by gaining the best writers, such as Breckenridge and others, by promises which shall be faithfully fulfilled, you may cause the most glorious and happy commotion, you will cover yourself with glory and expect the most brilliant fortune,” &c. If this were our only document, it would be a most persuasive evidence of a previous intelligence between the Baron and general Wilkinson. He had been his pensioner while second in command. Having attained the first rank, he was now placed in a situation by the approaching rupture between the two nations, to elect between open rebellion and a return to duty. The Spaniard seems to have somewhat apprehended the latter, but to have calculated from his knowledge of the general's character, that he might be brought openly to throw off his allegiance> He therefore directs Power to flatter his vanity with the prospect of being the founder of a new republic. His avarice had been successfully tried before, and now hundreds of thousands of dollars figure in every line, money is not to be wanting, and his two ruling passions are to be excited to the utmost pitch. What can express the insolent certainty the had of the commander's treachery more fully, than that when enumerating the reasons why they counted upon success, such as that the people were discontented with their taxes, that France and Spain were disgusted with the government, and that the army was weak, the Baron adds, that it was devoted to Wilkinson? This is the first time that the devotion of an army to its chief was placed in the list of reasons which were to en- |
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sure the success of its enemies; and the expression can only be accounted for, by supposing that the general was as much devoted to the enemy as the army were to him. Again, observe the distinction that is made between those who were already entered on the pension list, and those whom it was expedient still to tempt. “GAIN (says the Baron) Breckenridge and other writers who have influence, by promises which shall be faithfully fulfilled”—“represent these arguments with force to Wilkinson, La Cassagne and Sebastian, and you will produce the most glorious commotion.” Promises were necessary to Breckenridge, because he had not yet been bribed. Nothing but extortion was necessary to induce Wilkinson and Sebastian—promises were not necessary to them, because they had not only been made, but recognised, and they only wanted a little encouragement to appear what they really were. Sebastian has been convicted and degraded by his country, for having been at the time of this letter was written, in the pay of Spain. Does not the association of Wilkinson's name with his, in this confidential letter of instructions, prove an equality of guilt? The Baron de Carondelet did not however know the character of our general. He was willing to carry on any correspondence, provided it could be kept secret, and while in a subordinate station he was willing to risk a place for which he knew he could obtain an indemnity. But the scene was now changed, he was at the head of the army, his legal emo- |
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luments were great, and his rapacity foresaw the means of increasing them. His secret correspondence had been suspected. The frequent visits of Power had occasioned jealousy—and the indiscreet communications of the Spanish officers, as we learn from himself, had excited more than attention to his conduct. He was not yet prepared openly to assume the Spanish uniform, and a secret correspondence had become dangerous. Power, therefore, did not fully succeed in the object of his mission. He however undertook it, and his answer to the Baron's letter, (No. 40,) which is dated at Natchez, 4th June, 1797, contains among other matter highly useful on this occasion, the following precious extract: “I will tell W. that the difficulty and danger of carrying money by land, have prevented you from sending the 640 dollars. The ambition and policy of this general, are a sure pledge to me that hew will support our plans (which have always been his own) with all his influence, and we may rely on Nicholas, Sebastian, Innes, Murray, Clark, &c. and all, in a word, who are attached to Wilkinson, as well as those who are to compose the army of Clark.” The whole of this letter deserves the serious attention of those who wish to form a correct judgment on this point. Mr. Power sat out soon after the date of this letter, and after a variety of adventure, the details of which would be useless on this occasion, he arrived at Detroit, the head quarters of the American general, during his absence, and was treated by Col. Strong, who had the temporary command, with the rigour which the public knowledge of his former errands |
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seemed to merit. Advice of this visit was given to general Wilkinson while on his way to Detroit. Here let a respectable witness, whom we have before heard speak in his own language. “On our way down to Detroit, (says capt. Sterret in his letter No. 41-SEE NOTE 11,) as we entered the river St. Clair, we met a command of men with dispatches for the general. The same day after having read his letters, he invited me to go on shore with him to shoot pigeons. While on shore he told me that Mr. Thomas Power had arrived at Detroit in his absence, that colonel Strong, the commandant, acting under an order of major general Wayne's, had him in confinement—that he was apprehensive that he would have to send Mr. Power out of the country, although he knew him to be an honest clever fellow, a man of talents, and one that had rendered him great services; but unfortunately that Mr. P. was suspected as a spy, and that the United states suspected him, gen. W. and at the same time quoting the old adage, that it was more criminal in some to look over the hedge than in others to steal a hare, asking me "how I should like to take a trip to New-Madrid with Mr. Power." I answered very well, he then enjoined secrecy on me. We arrived at Detroit before the middle of September, 1797, and found Mr. P. (as the general had stated) in confinement. He was immediately set at liberty, and a few days afterwards I dined with him at the general's table. A very short time after this (perhaps a day) I was sent for by the general, who informed me that he had other duty for me than that of escorting Mr. P. that capt. Shaum- |
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bourgh was selected for that command, that I must hold myself in readiness to proceed to Kentucky, there to procure money on bills and pay the troops at Fort Massack and Fort Knox at Vincennes, which order I obeyed and left Mr. P. at Detroit. In the beginning of November following, I met capt. Shaumbourgh at Fort Massack on his return from N. Madrid, where he had delivered Mr. Power. He showed me his instructions from the general relative to Mr. P. in which capt. S. was ordered not to permit Mr. P. to enter any of our ports, and denied him the use of pen, ink, pencil, or paper, &c.; on reading those instructions I expressed some surprise at this great precaution when I knew that Me. Power had traveled through that country on his way, and that he had his full liberty at Detroit. Capt Shaumbourgh laughing, said it was a bore.” Before I refer to the evidence of Mr. Power himself on this occasion, let me advert to one circumstance which must be conclusive. Independent of any light thrown on the subject by Mr. Power himself, it is clear form a document which cannot be rejected, the original instructions from Carondelet, that Mr. Power was sent for the express purpose of making proposals to W. derogatory to his dignity, and inconsistent with his allegiance as a citizen and his duty as an officer. It is clear from the testimony of Mr. Sterret, and from the general's own letters, that he was well received, that he staid some days, and that he had several conferences with him. It is impossible not to suppose that in those conferences he complies with the instructions given by his supe- |
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rior, and that he had made the proposition which he had undertaken to do. What would have been the conduct of an honourable man, on receiving such a proposition? would he not have treated the corrupter and his agent with indignation and contempt, knowing, as he confessed to captain Sterret, that the suspicions of the president were excited—would he not, if they were groundless, have seized that opportunity of removing them, and by the punishment of the agent and the exposure of the principal have cleansed himself from the foul suspicions under which he laboured? But he dared not to do this—he felt himself too much in their power to come to those extremities which were necessary to the establishment of his character—there were too many witnesses of his dishonour—too many letters evincive of his guilt; he therefore, to save appearance, did no more than he meditated before he saw Power—he sent him under feigned restraint to the very place to which he wished to go; and he wrote him a letter which he thought would impose on the world, but which is, when fully considered, the strongest proof of his duplicity and collusion. The letter acknowledges a first nocturnal interview, in which the return of Power was insisted on by the general; it expresses a perseverance in that determination because Mr. Power approached him, as he says, in a public character, and on national business, which required a speedy answer; that therefore he (Power) was no free agent, so as to elect the time or route of his return, but that stood bound by motives of political import as well to Spain as to the United |
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States to communicate the object of his mission with all possible promptitude,” &c. Is this, I ask, the language of integrity offended by the most humiliating and degrading propositions? Whoever does not see in it proof of an attempt to cover a co-operation in treachery by the flimsy veil of affected severity, must be insensible to the force if evidence, and will be every day the dupe of knavery. Let this letter (No. 42 ) be examined in this view , and we should have no doubt of the positive testimony of Mr. Power; (No. 43;) his details will however convince the most incredulous, and the manner in which every part of it is supported by the other evidence, leaves no doubt of its veracity; and to avoid any subterfuge to be made from the alleged frailty of memory, let it be remembered that this account was given at the time of the transaction, and is the original draft of a letter to governor Gayoso, giving the official account of Mr. Power's mission—one passage of it is characteristic: “the general received me coldly enough; in the first conference he broke out with saying to me very bitterly. 'we are ruined sir, both you and myself, without receiving any benefit from your voyage,' Afterwards he asked me whether I had brought the 640 dollars—(eternally these 640 dollars!)—he added that the executive had given orders to the governor of the North-Western Territory to take me and send me to Philadelphia, and that there was no other resource left for me to escape but to suffer myself to be conducted immediately under guard to Fort Massack, and from thence to New-Madrid; and having informed him of the |
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proposition of the Baron, he proceeded to tell me that it was a chimerical project, and impossible to be executed; that the inhabitants of the western states, having obtained all they wished by the treaty, would form no other political or commercial connection, and that now they had no other motive to separate themselves from the interests of the other states, although France and Spain had made them the most advantageous propositions; that the fermentation which had existed for four years was now subsided, &c.; that Spain had nothing else to do but to give complete effect to the treaty which had overturned all his plans, and rendered useless the work of more than ten years.—And inasmuch as he had, as he said, destroyed his cyphers and all his correspondence with our government, and that his duty and his honour did not permit him to continue it; that the governor need not fear that he would abuse the confidence he had placed in him; finally, that Spain having ceded to the United States the territory of the Natchez, &c. it might happen that he would be appointed governor of it, and that then opportunities would not be wanting for him to take measures that would be more efficacious to effect his political projects. He complained much that the secret of his connections with our government had been divulged through want of prudence on our part,” &c. Here then we have the cause of his new prudery in the general's character. The project was now dangerous, and therefore he would not embark in it. He now bethought him of his honour and his duty, which had slept for 10 years. He now for the first time recol- |
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lected what he owed to his country and the station in which he was placed. But his illumination of honour was but a momentary flash; it could not support him through a single conference, and in the very breath in which he abjures the ruinous connection, he shows that fear, not principle, induced him to make the temporary abandonment; he complains that the treaty which secured the beat interests of his country had ruined his projects—adverts to the jealousy of his government, and looks forward to the happy period when the government of Natchez would enable him to plot with more success the dismemberment of his country.—A commentary on such evidence is unnecessary; it speaks at once to the understanding, and the prejudice must be rooted indeed that can resist its force. In a letter from the Baron Carondelet to Mr. Power, dated 23d April, 1797, (No. 44,) is the following passage: “I have just written to W. and have given my letter to Mr. Nolan, a charming young man, whom I regard very highly (garcon aharmant et dont je faisle plus grand cas). He has told me that he has a sure opportunity to convey it to him, and it is a long time since I have written to him for want of an opportunity, and for fear of committing him (crainte de le compromettre).” In all the intercourse between Wilkinson and the Spaniards, we find Mr. Nolan; this “child of his own” seems to have had as versatile talents as his adoptive father, and he is alternatively engaged in the dark diplomacy or the contraband commerce of his employer. If the Baron de Carondelet had nothing that was im- |
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proper to write, why should he so long delay his communications for a safe opportunity , and whence the anxious fear of committing his correspondent? if the object of their correspondence were honourable of lawful? Here I close the exhibition of the proofs on the subject of the bribes which were given by the Spanish government, and the corruption which they produced. I close it, as will be remarked, without any reference to my personal knowledge of the general outline of Wilkinson's plan, and to his unequivocal confession as detailed in my affidavit laid before congress. It is not for me to weigh the credit which that declaration deserves. I annex it however, (No. 45,) that it may be scruitinised and re-examined, and that it may be compared with the other proofs; and I then leave it to my country to decide this important question between us. I ought to remark that in stating the sum taken round by Collins, I mention eleven thousand dollars or upwards. My information of the sum came from Collins, who I suppose must have received the whole sum and afterwards divided it with Owens, as the two together form a sum upwards of 11,000 dollars, as stated in my position. If I were now to make the new declaration, or if I am ever called on before a proper tribunal to testify again on this subject, I could add many circumstances which further recollection and a perusal of documents have brought to my remembrance, but my object as I stated is to show that the proof, independent of my own assertion, is sufficient to have born down my adversary, and to support my |
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